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The economy 
after the crisis
«The crisis is a chance for us to step back and to address some
things. I like to say that things that can’t go on forever usually
don’t. There is a whole set of forces underlying this crisis: the
increasing leverage in the banking system, the rapid rise in property
prices around the world, the enormous growth of the Chinese
economy, the growing trade surplus in Asia. These things will all
ultimately have to come to an end and be adjusted, and I think this
crisis is going to precipitate a lot of that.»
ANTONI GURGUÍ
Interview with Gary Hamel
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This interview is going to be the for the third
 issue of Paradigmes, a magazine that tries to
explore new paradigms for the future of society,
as its name indicates. This time, it is going to
be a monograph about the crisis, not so much
about the past but about how this crisis is going
to change the economy. I am not going to talk
about hot topics…
But I am happy to talk about the crisis if you like
as well. I have been writing about this for the
Wall Street Journal, and I certainly have points of
view about some of this, so, whatever you’d like
to talk about.
There is not a lot of consensus over what the
crisis is about. You hear lots of silly things
these days. But even among these big discrep-
ancies, different views, there is one opinion
that seems to be commonly held: this could be
a deep crisis, an important one, which may
therefore change things. If there is a long term
crisis, what do you think it is going to be?
Which things are going to change most? We
are talking of course about the economy  itself,
 globalization, corporate governance,
 management and so on.
First of all, I think it will be an extended crisis
because there are some fundamental, global
imbalances which helped precipitate this crisis
and which ultimately must be resolved. In the
United States, we have a negative savings rate;
that cannot go on. Around the world, many
countries have consumers loading up on debt,
gorging on debt; that cannot go on. In fact,
 household indebtedness is higher in Britain than
it is in the United States. You’ve had people
around the world believing somehow that property
is a long-term store value and an investment,
and, historically, that has not been true. But over
the last few years, people became somehow
 convinced that their houses were these enormous
financial assets, and so I think that attitude is
going to change. You’ve seen China with a highly
managed exchange rate, accumulating huge,
 destabilizing, global reserves that have actually
driven a lot of this problem. So I think the crisis is
a chance for us to step back and to address some
of these things. I like to say that things that can’t
go on forever usually don’t. There is a whole set
of forces underlying this crisis: the increasing
leverage in the banking system, the rapid rise in
property prices around the world, the enormous
growth of the Chinese economy, the growing trade
surplus in Asia. These things will all ultimately
have to come to an end and be adjusted, and I
think this crisis is going to precipitate a lot of that.
«Over the last few years, people
became somehow convinced that their
houses were these enormous financial
assets, and that attitude is going to
change.»
So at the end what you’re saying is that this crisis
is simply a healthy remedy for deep sickness
that the global economy has been developing for
years. But I’ll come back to the original point,
after emerging from this crisis, which things will
have changed?
Now it’s very hard to see clearly, but I think there
are a few things that will change. First, I do not
think that we will let banks take the same kind of
risks with their balance sheets they have taken
over the last few years. The financial services sector
is really the foundation for capitalism; for that
house, that structure and given that critical role,
they need to be managed with a level of prudence,
foresight and care that has been enormously
 lacking over the last few years. So, I think that
there will be a fundamental reform of the
 banking sector. Now, whenever I talk about these
issues, I get many letters from bankers to say
«Let’s be clear it is not all community banks; it’s
not every bank that has been part of this crisis.»
But certainly the large global banks have played
a role in this, so I expect more regulation in
 banking, I expect long-term legislation around
capital adequacy, around executive compensation,
bonuses and so on.
Beyond that sector, I think it’s too early to tell
what kind of long-term change this is going to
precipitate. Some people have described this as a
crisis in capitalism. I don’t think that that’s true at
all. I think it is a banking crisis, a financial crisis.
I don’t think that most people want the government
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more involved in the telecommunications sector
or in the airlines sector or retailing – they don’t.
And so to people who see this as opening the
door to a huge increase in government influence
on the economy, I think that may happen in the
short run as we have to resolve the banking crisis,
but I think it would be a mistake for this to be an
opportunity for back-door socialism, because
I think that has been largely discredited. In fact,
you could argue that many of the things that
 precipitated this crisis really came, not from a lack
of regulation, but from misregulation. In the
United States, two large government backed
institutions, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had
basically a congressional mandate to buy just
about any loan that was made to anybody in the
United States, and everyone from the Chinese to
the mortgage originators, everyone around the
world, believed that these institutions had backing
from the US government and would not be
allowed to fail, and so it turned out. And that
 created an enormous moral hazard but which
was not so much a lack of regulation as a complete
misregulation: telling a large financial institution
«We want you to create mortgages for anyone.»
In fact, these were called Ninja Loans—No
Income, No Jobs, No Assets—and were given to
people who should never have been offered a
mortgage, so in many senses, that was a problem
of government interference. There were cases in
which there should have been more government
oversight. Some years back, the Federal Reserve
in the United States had agreed with the large
investment banks that those banks would
 maintain certain leverage ratios, and yet the Fed
never monitored that, never performed a single
audit, never held banks to those standards.
So, we will see more regulation but I think it is
wrong to see this as somehow a crisis of capitalism
or failure of capitalism. It’s a failure of adequate
supervision of some key institutions.
I think another way that government has, in a
sense, precipitated this, is that governments have
stood by while we have seen enormous consoli-
dation in financial services. We have seen banks
buying other banks and getting bigger and bigger
to the point where you get so big that you cannot
be allowed to fail. Well, I’m not sure that we want
institutions that are so big that every time they
get into trouble, the government has to rush in to
help. So that was maybe a lack of government
oversight as well.
However, I also think it’s useful to remember
that about every eight, nine, ten years, banks
go through this kind of a crisis. They went
through this crisis with loans to less developed
countries, they went through it with the Russian
bonds, they went through it with the dotcom boom
and then bust, and now we’re going through it
again. And the really interesting question to ask
is why every ten years or so do a large share of
the world’s bankers all join hands and like lem-
mings jump off a cliff? I describe this as bankers’
bulimia because every few years they binge and
then they purge. They accumulate a lot of low-
quality debt, everyone believes that this is a great
thing to do and then a few years later they all
disgorge it at great cost to their shareholders and
to society at large. I think we really have to say:
Can we afford this as a society? Because this has
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been very expensive every time it happens and
because these institutions are so large, they tend
to privatize the gains in good times, they go into
bonuses and then they socialize the losses in bad
times; the rest of us taxpayers have to pick up
these losses, and as a taxpayer I can tell you
I don’t want to have to go through this again.
So we do have to look at this problem.
«I don’t think that that’s a crisis in
capitalism. I think it is a banking
crisis, a financial crisis.»
At the start, you said that this crisis was good.
Just now you have described the dangers that
existed in the financial sector. But at the start
you also said that there were imbalances, huge
debts held by people, by countries, for example
the United States has a huge trade deficit and
this is also the case in Spain where it’s a worse
percentage of GDP so, this is another very big
imbalance. And of course you mentioned China,
which is experiencing exactly the opposite
 scenario. How do you think this is going to be
resolved?
At every level of society we have built in too
much leverage. Households are too indebted and
companies have got themselves into a lot of debt.
If you look at the whole private equity boom
over the last few years that basically geared up
companies, debt was cheap, interest payments
are tax deductable, you had all kinds of reasons to
take healthy companies and load a lot more debt
on them. This applies to households, companies
and of course governments. We’ve all been living
beyond our means. But de-leveraging is a very
painful process because in the short term it
means that consumption has to go down and
savings have to go up, and nobody wants to be
told they’re going to have to swallow that bitter
pill. But I don’t see any way around it; we’ve just
been living literally beyond our means. Govern-
ments have, companies have, individuals have
and now we’re going to have to pay the price for
our profligacy over the past few years and I can’t
see any easy way or painless way to get around
that. I think it’s going to be a very challenging
situation. I don’t expect equity markets to really
reach their historical highs again maybe for five,
six or seven years on average around the world.
You just had a lot of unrealistic expectations built
into stock prices and asset prices of all kinds.
«At every level of society we have
built in too much leverage.
Households are too indebted and
companies have got themselves into
a lot of debt.»
I think one of the problems and one of the reasons
we got into this kind of difficulty is that all of the
models that were being used by the bankers to
price the risk of default, that were behind all of
the credit default swaps issued, all of these models
only looked back eight or nine or ten years and to
a period in the global economy when it looked
like there was only one way to go, it was all
growth. They had no history of asset price defla-
tion. They’d never been through that, the young
people, these rocket scientists making all these
financial assurances didn’t believe it could happen.
I think if there’s one thing the crisis proved once
again it is that stupidity is contagious; everyone
starts to believe the same thing. People talk about
the wisdom of crowds, and I think that’s true:
often the many are smarter than the few, but
I think that we also have to recognize that some-
times you have the stupidity of crowds. When
everyone, or the majority of people in a financial
system are all similarly vested in one outcome
(and in this case they were all vested in higher
property prices and growth, and so on), then
 people can be collectively blind to the reality. In
2006, I bought a derivatives security that effectively
allowed me to short the US housing industry
because I could see that house prices were going
up at a level that had no historical precedent;
there was no reason to believe that would
 continue. In fact, when you look at some of these
longer-term historical relationships like the rela-
tionship between house price and disposable
income, or house price and rent or average price
earnings ratios in the stock market, these things
always tend to revert back to the mean. I remem-
ber, in 2000, just before that particular downturn
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 particularly, the role of financial service is to
extend credit to those who deserve it. It’s to
 allocate capital in rational ways so that society’s
resources are allocated to the best possible uses.
It’s to manage and preserve the wealth of people
who have spent their lives earning it. In many
senses over the last few years, people who have
gone into financial services have not had that
sense of stewardship, have not had that sense
of societal responsibility. Instead the goal was to
make the best possible bonuses. I think business
schools perhaps are responsible for not commu-
nicating more clearly, not imparting a sense of
responsibility to the people who are running
those institutions, who are going there.
You go back just ten or fifteen years, for most of
the big investment banks, the majority of their
income came from fees they were earning on the
services they provided to individuals and companies.
Over the last few years, the majority of their
income came from their own proprietary trading.
Now I regard that as a fundamental conflict of
interest. You cannot be trading on your own
account and also serving my best interests; it just
doesn’t work that way. So I think there is in many
senses a moral crisis at the heart of the financial
crisis, and the people we trusted to be prudent
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in the stock market, the average price earnings
ratio for S&P companies in the United States was
30:1. Historically the average is 15:1, so sooner or
later it’s going to go back to the mean. And of
course every single time, somebody wants to
invent a new story about why it’s different now,
why somehow we’re going to defy the rules of
gravity and all those historic precedents no longer
hold. But surprise! Sooner or later, gravity
reasserts itself and precedent takes over. We tend
to undershoot going down, we overshoot on the
upside and undershoot on the downside.
But another set of questions this crisis may
 provoke is how the current management of these
financial institutions is leading to more volatility.
Computer trading, the near instantaneous trans-
mission of information, the fact that most fund
managers today are measured on a quarterly
basis, mean that if you’re managing a pension
fund or large mutual fund and you’re measured
on a quarterly basis against markets, you
don’t worry about long-term fundamentals.
You don’t worry about share value investing; you
only worry about momentum investing. What you
really track is not the underlying fundamentals of
these companies or the economy, but the opinions
of your peers. You’re trying to outguess them,
 outbet them. How much longer can I ride this
before inevitably we fall off the cliff together?
And I think that has led to a huge amount of
short-term, destructive behavior in the economy.
I think we may see some new incentives that
 create reasons for people to hold their shares
longer, that try to limit the kind of volatility that
you have in markets today, that is a product of
instantaneous transfer of information, computer
trading, of the incentive systems that we have
invented for the fund managers. These are all
contributing in different ways to this volatility.
Two very short questions. First, do you think that
what’s being taught in business schools is
something to address? Do we have to rethink the
kind of knowledge and perhaps the values we
are teaching?
That’s a very hard question, but I think the answer
is yes, to the extent that you need to see busi -
ness as having a broader social role. In finance
«I would argue that the technology we use to run
large companies is going to have to change.»
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and to take a long-term view and to be careful
with our money, they were not; they behaved as
if they were in a casino. So I don’t know how
much of the blame you can put on business
schools. I think they may be a minor part of this
story. But going forward, one of the things we
have to change is that we have to understand
that managers in businesses are there not merely
to serve the shareholders; they are there to serve
the interests of society. Companies exist as legal
entities at the discretion of societies. You won’t
find any constitution that writes into law the right
of a company to exist. That is something we have
created as individuals, we’ve legislated on and
we can take those rights away if we think that
organizations are abusing them, and CEO’s and
companies need to keep that in mind.
After saying all this, would you change anything
in your book The Future of Management?
No, I don’t think I would change anything.
I would argue that the technology we use to run
large companies is going to have to change.
I think what I will say is that in a crisis there’s
often an almost automatic response to centralize.
So when you get into trouble you try to pull
authority back, try to manage things from the
center and I understand that. It is a natural
 tendency. Yet I think it’s the wrong tendency,
because we do have to have better discipline, bet-
ter control of our organizations, but in a very
dynamic world you can’t exert that control from
the center. You don’t know enough about what’s
going on on the ground: things are changing too
fast. If you look, for example, at the credit default
swap market: in 2001, it was worth virtually
nothing, but the outstanding credit default swaps
in 2007 were 45 trillion dollars. Now there’s no
traditional top-down bureaucratic control that
can track or can understand that and get in front
of it. It’s not about do we need control and disci-
pline and so on. We do. But I think the challenge
is how do you build that from within so that
every individual has that sense of responsibility
and knows where the boundaries are, rather than
trying to exert that control from a few staff peo-
ple, bureaucrats and so on who are trying to
manage something that is moving so fast and that
they cannot really comprehend. So I think that the
crisis points up certain challenges that I talked
about in my book. I think principally one of those
is how do you get control to come from within
people, self-control rather than control coming
from a lot of rules and regulations and close
supervision and so on, because we can’t go back
to the kind of top-down organizational models
we had thirty, forty years ago. So we’re going to
have to reinvent management so that we can
avoid this kind of a crisis, but without strangling
the adaptability or responsiveness of companies
so that they become overly bureaucratic.
I think that’s a good point to close. Thank you.
Pleasure!
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